Formal Theories in International Relations. NNNReviews a wide variety of explanations of international relations using formal theory, focusing on topics such as conflict, problems of uncertainty, bargaining, alliances, and arms races.
Honor, Symbols, and War. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, NNNUses game theory to examine the importance of honor and symbols in international politics. Argues that fighting over honor is a major cause of war. Slantchev, Branislav L. DOI: NNNUses game theory to examine how military threats can be employed in the pursuit of political objectives. Focuses on how military threats can establish commitments and communicate intent. Wagner, R. NNNUses game theory to examine realism and general theories of international politics.
Demonstrates that realism is unable to explain international conflict and international politics more generally. Zagare, Frank C. Perfect Deterrence. NNNDevelops a new theory of deterrence focusing on the importance of credibility and capability. Because the authors focus on general deterrence, the theory provides a general explanation of international conflict. Edited by Robert A. Danemark, — Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, NNNTraces the history of applications of game theory in international relations.
Provides a useful historical overview. Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content on this page. Please subscribe or login. Oxford Bibliographies Online is available by subscription and perpetual access to institutions.
For example, if there is a model of Iran-Israel nuclear conflict in extensive form, then the same solution can be found provided that it exists. As a result, game theory becomes a paradigm through the existence of commonly agreed upon concepts and assumptions. Starting in the s, political scientists found game theory quite useful in their analyses. The s, for example, were prolific years in the field of coalitional bargaining, voting, and coalition formation.
Economists discovered how powerful the tool of game theory is much later in s especially through a program called Nash equilibrium refinement. Nevertheless, while game theory became a major staple in economic analyses, there has been no parallel move in the field of international relations. To illustrate, no student who ignores Nash equilibrium can pass a microeconomics course yet no such condition exists for an IR student, say in a course on IR theory.
The source of the difference is the tolerance for and the use of mathematics in economics. The IR discipline is divided into many islands of theoretical approaches ranging from realism to liberalism, constructivism, and critical IR works. A majority of IR students would think that game theory is of use only if one frames an international interaction in realist terms like power, motives for expansion, and maximization of self-interest.
Well, this is completely wrong. To illustrate, game-theoretic models do not require that all states are cast as selfish egoists; on the contrary, states can be presented as altruistic players. Indeed, as long as there is room for ideas and beliefs in theories of preference formation, dynamic game models can dwell into areas where social constructions are argued to play a major role. Naturally, no one has an obligation to learn game theory. Yet, those motivated students can try to master it and enjoy its power in generating explanations.
If they construct a game, they must be aware that the assumptions of the model lead to constrained and stylized explanations. There is, in fact, a trade-off: game theory cannot help students to understand and predict international phenomena if it has no connection with empirical facts, and, if too many observed details are included in the model, deductions become intractable.
In gist, the creativity of modelers is of utmost importance in using game theory. The construction of correspondence between abstract concepts and empirical observations is not an easy task. Once the work is finished, and results are obtained, one can compare game-theoretic explanations with explanations other research tools and approaches to IR generate. It is possible that readers find game-theoretic explanations not as enriching as those other theories yield. Nevertheless, the game theorist has an upper hand: she can be certain that the model implies the explanation provided that assumptions are justified and she correctly derives conditions for equilibrium, equilibria or even no equilibrium.
A common example of the Prisoners Dilemma in IR is trade agreements. Both nations can benefit by working together and signing the agreement.
One nation can then cheat on the agreement, and receives more of a benefit at the cost of the other. The second player, or nation in this case, has the same option. They can cheat on the agreement and hope to gain more than the first nation, but if the both cheat, they both do very poorly. This is why international trade negotiations are often tense and difficult.
Stag Hunt is a game in which the players must cooperate in order to hunt larger game, and with higher participation, they are able to get a better dinner. If participation is not universal, they cannot surround the stag and it escapes, leaving everyone that hunted stag hungry.
However, anyone who hunts rabbit can do so successfully by themselves, but with a smaller meal. The closest approximation of this in International Relations are universal treaties, like the Kyoto Protocol environmental treaty. In the long term, environmental regulation in theory protects us all, but even if most of the countries sign the treaty and regulate, some like China and the US will not for sovereignty reasons, or because they are experiencing great economic gain.
Most events in IR are not mutually beneficial, like in the Battle of the Sexes. For example, most land disputes, like the ongoing Chinese and Japanese dispute over the Senkaku Islands, must be resolved by compromising in other areas of policy in order to achieve the goal.
0コメント